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With Nigeria’s religious conflict growing into ever higher contentious phases, review of the history of Nigeria’s religious background and the Boko Haram continue their imperativeness. We continue to provide both in this posting, with the following as a news UPDATE

Islamic school attack in Lagos

One of Lago’s Islamic schools where 50 children were attending class was bombed, wounding six pupils and a teacher,

The bombing took place few days after radical Islamist militants of Boko Haram launched a series of deadly bombings across the country on Christmas, leaving at least 39 dead and dozens wounded.

Boko Haram has carried out increasingly sophisticated and bloody attacks in its campaign to implement strict Shariah law across Nigeria. The group is responsible for at least 504 killings this year alone.

While initially targeting Islamic and Christian clerics, politicians, policemen and soldiers via hit-and-run assassinations from the back of motorbikes after the 2009 riot, violence by Boko Haram now has a new sophistication and apparent planning that includes high-profile attacks with greater casualties.


 

NIGERIA is experiencing many difficult situations as it tries to resolve its history. The demarcation of Nigeria’s North and South is centuries old. Started with the Arab and Islam entry into the area and stopping just at the then rain forest boarder and the Tsetse flies infestation that prevented the Arab horses to go any further south - more or less along the 12th parallel. By 1500 the northern part of Nigeria, as well as the entire area north of the 12th parallel became Islam and so remains. The Berlin Conference of 1884-85 established the British Nigeria’s demarcation and much of today’s boarders reflect the Conference agreements. The Berlin Conference disregarded any religious affiliations of the various chiefdoms and areas. Western education and the development of a modern economy proceeded more rapidly in the south than in the north, with consequences felt in Nigeria's political life ever since Nigeria after independence continued to face the north–south political and socio-religious issues. A major historical marker was the Biafran War, and now the Boko Haram events that are bordering on insurgency.

Analysis: Understanding Nigeria’s Boko Haram

Boko Haram was formed by Muslim cleric Mohammed Yusuf in 2002, in Maiduguri. Initially peaceful, in June 2009 the radical sect waged a short-lived armed uprising in a bid to establish an Islamic state in the north. This was brutally crushed by the military in July 2009, leaving over 800 dead, mostly sect members.

During the crackdown, leader Mohammed Yusuf and several other members including Yusuf’s father-in-law, Alhaji Baba Fugu, were killed in police custody.

Since January 2010, surviving sect members have reportedly been behind bomb and shoot-and-run attacks which have killed dozens of people not just in Maiduguri: An Abuja police HQ was bombed on 16 June.

The group is not easy to monitor, according to Human Rights Watch researcher Eric Guttschuss. “Since 2009 the leadership has gone underground. It’s now unclear what the exact command structure is.”

A spokesperson for Boko Haram told reporters that members had received training in Somalia. Okechukwu Nwanguma, program coordinator with non-profit Network on Police Reform in Nigeria (NOPRIN), said this could indicate Boko Haram has “a link with the global terror movement”.

Other reports have suggested the same thing, saying Boko Haram already has links to international terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda, and has the potential to link with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maher (AQIM) which operates in nearby regions.

Root causes of violence

Political solutions will only be delivered if some of the root causes driving Boko Haram membership are addressed, said Human Rights Watch researcher Eric Guttschuss. These include “poverty and unemployment, driven by poor governance and corruption.”

Guttschuss said former leader Yousef gained support “by speaking out against police and political corruption” on behalf of the country’s “vast numbers of unemployed youth [who] he was able to tap into for recruits”.
 
Violent uprisings in Nigeria, whether Boko Haram or other groups, are invariably the result of “social injustice” and “bad governance” said Abdulkarim Mohammed, a researcher on Boko Haram.
“Boko Haram is essentially the fallout of frustration with corruption and the attendant social malaise of poverty and unemployment… The young generation see how [the nation’s resources] are squandered by a small bunch of self-serving elite which breeds animosity and frustration, and such anger is ultimately translated into violent outbursts,” he said.

NOPRIN’s Nwanguma said there is speculation politicians from northern Nigeria are surreptitiously funding Boko Haram to force the current government to relinquish power. This follows recent controversial elections.

Michael Utasha of think-tank Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA) confirmed that he had heard similar accusations: “Unconfirmed reports have it that there are disgruntled members of the political class in Nigeria who are bent on destabilizing the government of President Goodluck and giving the impression that he is a weak and indecisive leader.”

But Tanko Yakasai, a member of the Northern Leaders Political Forum (NLPF), a political group that has pushed for the retention of power in the north for another four years, vehemently denied these claims, saying Boko Haram aims to destroy any system of secular government in Nigeria “irrespective of whether a Muslim or a Christian is in power”. Viewing Boko Haram “as a political gimmick to retain power in the north is trivializing the whole problem,” Yakasai added.

Heavy-handed

OSIWA’s Utasha accused the authorities of exacerbating tensions with the sect and thus enflaming violence. The 16 June Abuja attack, he said, “was a direct response to some irresponsible and inflammatory comments by the inspector-general of police, Hafiz Ringim, who only a few days before the attack had boasted that the days of the group were numbered.”

The governor of Borno State has reportedly admitted the army reacted too strongly to the recent Maiduguri violence, and said measures are being taken to check their behavior.

Boko Haram militants attacked an army patrol in Maiduguri with explosives and gunfire. In the ensuing shootout soldiers claimed they killed 11 sect members; while two soldiers were injured. Following this, civilians said their houses were burned and people shot by the army. Thousands of civilians have now fled the city in fear of further violence.

Local members of the respected Borno Elders Forum called for the withdrawal of troops from the city, saying the soldiers have worsened the security situation.

The police have taken some positive action to combat impunity in the past, said Guttschuss, pointing to five police officers recently charged with the extra-judicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf, as an “important step”. While this occurred some two years after events, it sent a message that “regardless of who commits crime they will be held accountable. But whether this will diffuse the attacks is yet to be seen,” he said.

However, dealing with the perpetrators of attacks, and army/police reprisals requires more fundamental criminal justice sector reform, said Amnesty International in a 27 June statement.

“We initially thought the military would employ logical strategies to put an end to this cycle of violence... [but] the soldiers went from door to door killing innocent people, they broke into homes stealing property and raping young women," Bulama Mali Gubio, a member of the Borno Elders forum disclosed.

Military spokespeople are defensive, blaming the burning of houses in the Kalari neighborhood of Maiduguri on explosives used by Boko Haram. "My men are not responsible for the exodus [of people] because even before the deployment of soldiers people were leaving the city," military commander Brig-Gen Jack Okechukwu Nwaogbo declared.

Negotiation

When attacks by Boko Haram increased this year, President Goodluck Jonathan initially assured people the situation was under control, comparing it to violence in the Niger Delta that was partially improved through eventual negotiation and an amnesty program.

Analysts from the Economist Intelligence Unit have suggested that the religious fanaticism of Boko Haram means this approach is less likely to be effective.

Others insist engagement is necessary. “It is only when the government understands their [Boko Haram’s] mindset that it can effectively tackle the problem,” said researcher Abdukarim Mohammed.

Borno State governor Kashim Shettima has reportedly invited Boko Haram to engage in a dialogue, stressing the government was ready to address their demands.

But negotiation will only work if the government is genuinely willing to engage and consider creative options, such as a “more genuine” amnesty, said the chairman of the Adamawa State chapter of the All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP), Alhaji Umar Duhu. He said members were currently still afraid of being arrested or killed by security forces if they surrendered.

Negotiation or not, more targeted intelligence-gathering is needed to curb future violence, according to NOPRIN’s Nwanguma. “What we are witnessing in Nigeria are the consequences of a national intelligence and security system that fails to recognize that contemporary crimes demand more reliable and timely intelligence than guns and armored personnel carriers.”

In the meantime, the current situation remains out of control, Nwanguma argues: “Clearly, Boko Haram has virtually overrun northern Nigeria, despite deployment of soldiers,” he said. “They have continued to operate beyond the control of the Nigerian government and security forces.”

Cities in north Nigeria where Boko Haram has focused its attacks


NIGERIA: Timeline of Boko Haram activity

The following is a chronology of attacks by Boko Haram (BH) since 2003.

3 October 2011: Three killed in BH attacks on Baga market in Maiduguri, Borno State. The victims included a tea-seller, a drug store owner and a passer-by.

1 October 2011: A butcher and his assistant are killed by BH gunmen at Baga market in Maiduguri in a targeted killing. In a separate incident, three people are killed in a shoot-out following BH bomb and shooting attacks on a military patrol vehicle delivering food to soldiers at a checkpoint in Maiduguri. All three victims are civilians.

17 September 2011: Babakura Fugu, brother-in-law to slain BH leader Mohammed Yusuf, is shot dead outside his house in Maiduguri by two members of the sect, two days after attending a peace meeting with Nigeria’s ex-President Olusegun Obasanjo in the city.

13 September 2011: Four soldiers shot and wounded in an ambush by BH members in Maiduguri shortly after the arrest of 15 sect members in military raids on BH hideouts in the city.

12 September 2011: Seven men, including four policemen, are killed by BH gunmen in bomb and shooting attacks on a police station and a bank in Misau, Bauchi State. The attackers rob the bank.

4 September 2011: Muslim cleric Malam Dala shot dead by two BH members outside his home in the Zinnari area of Maiduguri.

1 September 2011: A shootout between BH gunmen and soldiers in Song, Adamawa State, kills one sect members while another is injured and captured.

26 August 2011: BH claims responsibility for a suicide bomb blast on the UN compound in Abuja, killing 23 people.

25 August 2011: Gun and bomb attacks by BH on two police stations and two banks in Gombi, Adamawa State, kill at least 16 people, including seven policemen.

27 June 2011: BH’s gun and bomb attack on a beer garden in Maiduguri leaves at least 25 dead and dozens injured.

20 June 2011: Seven people including five policemen killed in gun and bomb attacks on a police station and a bank in Kankara, Katsina State.

16 June 2011: BH targets national police headquarters in Abuja, killing two.

7 June 2011: Attacks on a church and two police posts in Maiduguri, blamed on the sect, leave at least 14 dead.

6 June 2011: Muslim cleric Ibrahim Birkuti, critical of BH, shot dead by two motorcycle-riding BH gunmen outside his house in Biu, 200km from Maiduguri.

29 May 2011: Three bombs rip through a beer garden in a military barracks in the northern city of Bauchi, killing 13 and wounding 33. BH claims responsibility.

27 May 2011: A group of around 70 suspected BH gunmen kill eight people including four policemen in simultaneous gun and bomb attacks on a police station, a police barracks and a bank in Damboa, Borno State, near the border with Chad.

29 December 2010: Suspected BH gunmen shoot dead eight people in Maiduguri, including the governorship candidate of the ruling All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) in Borno State.

24 and 27 December 2010: A series of attacks claimed by BH in the central city of Jos and Maiduguri kill at least 86.

7 September 2010: A group of BH gunmen free over 700 inmates including around 100 sect members from a prison in Bauchi. Four people including a soldier, one policeman and two residents were killed in the raid.

26 July 2009: BH launches a short-lived uprising in parts of the north, which is quelled by a military crackdown that leaves more than 800 dead - mostly sect members, including BH leader Mohammed Yusuf. A mosque in the capital of Borno State (Maiduguri) that served as a sect headquarters is burnt down.

2005-2008 BH went underground, reducing its attacks and focusing on recruiting new members and shoring up resources.

10 October 2004: BH gunmen attack a convoy of 60 policemen in an ambush near the town

of Kala-Balge on the border with Chad. The militants took 12 policemen hostage and police authorities presumed they were killed by the gunmen because all attempts to trace them failed.


Photo: Aminu Abubakar/IRIN-Scores of suspected members of Boko Haram at Maiduguri police headquarters in 2009


23 September 2004: BH militia attack police stations in the towns of Gwoza and Bama in Borno State, killing four policemen and two civilians. They took to the Mandara Mountains along the Nigeria-Cameroon border. Soldiers and two gunships were deployed in the mountains and after two days of battle 27 sect members were killed while the rest slipped away. Five BH members who crossed into Cameroon were arrested by Cameroonian gendarmes who had been alerted by Nigerian authorities. The five were deported and handed over to Nigerian authorities.

7 January 2004: Seven members of BH killed and three others arrested by a team of local vigilantes outside the town of Damboa, Borno State, near border with Chad. Bags containing AK-47 rifles were recovered from sect members.

June 2004: Four members of BH were killed by prison guards in a foiled jail break in Yobe State capital Damaturu.

23-31 December 2003: A group of about 200 BH militants launched attacks on police stations in the towns of Kanamma and Geidam in Yobe State from their enclave outside Kanamma on the Nigerian border with Niger. BH killed several policemen and requisitioned police weapons and vehicles. Following the deployment of military troops to contain the insurrection, 18 BH members were killed, and a number arrested.



 

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NIGERIA CORRUPTION CRISIS

Despite early optimism in Nigeria’s anti-corruption efforts, analysts and citizens are losing faith in the potential for progress; with Human Rights Watch (HRW) saying immediate action is necessary to maintain public confidence that fighting corruption can make a difference.

HRW researcher Chris Albin-Lackey said Nigeria’s main corruption-fighting agency, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), had initially “captured the imagination of Nigerians” and made them believe that corrupt politicians could be held to account. Established by the Nigerian government in 2002 the commission was given broad powers to investigate and prosecute economic and financial crimes, including government corruption.

But confidence in EFCC and President Jonathan’s government is fading. Nigeria stands at 134 in Transparency International’s annual corruption perceptions index, which ranks 178 countries in order of least to most corrupt.

Although EFCC is still the brightest hope for combating corruption in Nigeria, said Albin-Lackey,” the public face and the potential of the EFCC have started to slip [and] it needs public legitimacy to function.” Without prompt action to improve the commission, public confidence may erode too far for its legitimacy to be restored, he said.

Reforming the EFCC

Since the inception of the EFCC in 2002 only four senior politicians have been charged, each of whom received little or no jail time. The report details a series of cases where despite strong indications that certain politicians were involved in corruption, they were never prosecuted.

The ability of the EFCC to bring people to justice was hampered by extensive political interference in the judiciary, judicial inefficiency and deliberate delays. Of the EFCC’s 12 ongoing prosecutions of former state governors, eight have already “been dragged out for more than three years” with some lasting “more than four years without a single witness being called at trial”.


Ordinary citizens suffering

Corruption diverts resources from the oil-rich nation away from basic services where they are needed, says Albin-Lackey. “[Nigeria is] still very poor despite the oil resources,” he stated. “Oil revenues have increased but there has not been a corresponding increase in the quality of health and education services.”

In the human development index Nigeria currently stands at 142 out of 169. Life expectancy is only 48.4 years and unemployment is estimated at 19.7 percent. Maternal mortality was 840 per 100,000 live births in 2008, according to UN Children’s Fund. Lack of development has also been linked to criminal activity such as oil bunkering in the Niger Delta.

In Rivers State, in the oil-producing south, local government revenues have risen while the level of basic
services declines, according to a 2007 HRW study.

According to the study, revenues in 23 Local Government Councils rose steadily from US$31.7 million in 2000 to nearly $115 million in the first eight months of 2006. Despite increasing revenue, basic services frequently remained a low priority. For example, in Opobo/Nkoro the 2005 budget saw only 2.4 percent (or $170,000) allocated to education after teacher salaries - with half of that given in bursaries to university students from the local government. Only $23,000 was allocated to equipping, building and repairing local health facilities. This compares to the chairman’s travel budget of $53,800, and his “miscellaneous expenses” budget of $196,500.

Limited and declining basic services are a concern across the country. For example, national good water coverage fell from 49 percent in 1990 to
48 percent in 2004.